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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the state's fundamental power and the Water District's public character.
The state's power to regulate natural resources should not be denied or
limited by doctrines adopted when mining and agriculture were the only
public, concerns. The public's interest in water has changed and diversi-
fied, as is demonstrated by the popularity of all forms of water recrea-
tion. As the demand on recreational resources becomes greater because
of a larger population with more free-time, states must have adequate
methods for asserting the public right.34 Western water law has always
been flexibly administered in order to obtain the most beneficial use of
water.3 5 As Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "The formula had its origin in an
attempt to fit the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may
not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating principle.' '3 6 (Emphasis
supplied.) The Western States cannot allow the doctrine of appropria-
tion to "petrify" at the expense of the changing public interest in the
limited water supply.
JOHN R. GORDON.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GUILT FROM PRESENCE AT ILLEGAL DISTILLERY.
-Defendant Gainey's conviction for carrying on an illegal distillery
business was reversed by the United States court of appeals.' The court
held unconstitutional a statute2 authorizing an inference of guilt from
the accused's unexplained presence at a distillery. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
Defendant Romano's conviction of the possession, custody, and con-
"A good example of unimaginative application of the doctrine of appropriation with
disturbing results is Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011
(D. Colo. 1910), where. the district court found that the private town of Cascade
had water rights to the spray of Cascade Falls to keep the walls and floor of the
canyon green. The circuit court reversed in favor of the power company that wanted
to build a hydroelectric dam on the falls; holding that there was no diversion of
the spray nor application to a beneficial use because beauty was not an economical
use of water. 205 Fed. 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1913).
wWestern water law originated in the mining camps of California. Basey v. Gallagher,
supra note 15. The riparian theory was rejected (or avoided) by legislatures and
courts because of its rigidity. The mining custom of prior appropriation was better
suited to frontier environment. As more persons settled the land and streams
became fully appropriated, the "first come, first served" maxim of appropriation
proved impractical. The courts and legislatures made changes following the public
policy favoring the most economical use of water. See Wiel, Public Policy in Western
Water Decisions, 1 CALIF. L. REv. 11, 14-20 (1912); Wiel, Theories of Water Law,
supra note 6, at 531-33.
'Epstein v. Gluckin, 233. N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922). Justice Cardozo was
speaking of mutuality of remedy, but the principle is equally applicable here.
'Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
'68A Stat. 683 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (1) (1958) provides that: 'Any person
who . . .has in his possession or custody, or under his control, any still or distilling
apparatus set up which is not registered, as required by section 5179(a) . .. shall
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for
each such offense."
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trol of an unregistered still was reversed by the court of appeals3 on the
ground that a statute authorizing an inference of guilt from defendant's
unexplained presence at the site of the still violated due process of law.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed.
United States v. Romano, 15 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1965).
The Model Code of Evidence4 states that "a presumption is an assump-
tion of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be
assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise estab-
lished in the action." The effect of a presumption is to invoke a rule of
law which authorizes or compels the jury to return a verdict in accord-
ance therewith, in the absence of controverting evidence. 5 The principal
reason ascribed for the recognition of a presumption is that of proba-
bility. Proof of fact A renders the inference of the existence of fact B
so probable that the existence of fact B will be presumed until rebutted.
Other considerations are those of procedural convenience, fairness in
allocation of the burden of proof, and implicit notions of social and
economic policy.8
The juridical influence given an inference by virtue of a presumption
has a dual character. A presumption may either permit the jury to draw
the inference, or compel it to do so in the absence of contrary proof.
Professor McCormick characterizes the former as permissive presump-
tions and the latter as mandatory.7
Considerable judicial discord has its genesis in the question whether,
after evidence contrary to the presumption has been presented, the pre-
sumption vanishes or continues to have probative force. The majority
rule is that it vanishes and the jury may consider the proof free from
any such rule.8 Montana, in the minority, has taken the view that a pre-
26 U.S.C. § 5601(a) (4) provides that: "Any person who . . . carries on the business
of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law . . . shall
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for
each such offense.'
Section 5601(b) (1) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (1) the defendant is shown to have
been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus
was set up without having been registered, such presence of the defendant shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such
presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury).
Section 5601(b) (2) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant is shown to have
been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the business of a distiller or
rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such
presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury).
3United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964).
'Rule 13 (1942). REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-1301-3 provides that, "A
presumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from par-
ticular facts." For other definitions, see 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 49-52 (2d Ed. 1926);
THAYER, EVIDENCE 314 (1898); TRACY, EVIDENCE 29 (1952); MCCORMICK EVIDENCE
639 (1954). (Hereafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
520 AM. JuR. Evidence § 158 (1939).
OMcCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 641.
1 1d. at 640.
'New York Life Ins. Co. V. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938); Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82 (1934); Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
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sumption is in the nature of evidence and is to be evaluated upon that
basis. 9 A presumption therefore remains even though controverted by
other evidence and must be considered with the other evidence.
Statutes creating artificial presumptions of fact are being used with
increasing frequency. 10 In criminal cases, principally two tests have been
used by the courts in determining the constitutionality of such statutes.
The first is that of rational connection. For a statute to be constitutional
under this view, there must be a rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. The second test, that of com-
parative convenience, is applied only where the defendant has more con-
venient access to the proof, and where the burden of going forward with
such evidence will not be unfair. The United States Supreme Court has
considered the application of the two tests in the following language :
We are of opinion that these are not independent tests but that the
first is controlling and the second but a corollary. Under our de-
cisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there is no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience.
The fact, therefore, that the defendant has the better means of in-
formation will not, standing alone, justify the creation of such a presump-
tion, but such a consideration will be incorporated into the rational con-
nection test as the court applies it.
Prior to the instant cases the Supreme Court, in Bozza v. United
States, 12 considered a similar problem. In that case Bozza was charged in
one count with carrying on the business of a distiller with intent wil-
fully to defraud the United States. Count two charged him with having
possession and custody of the still. Testimony indicated that Bozza some-
times helped in the operation of the still and the manufacture of the alco-
hol but that he did not participate in the handling and mixing of the
mash. The Court found that Bozza's activities were those of carrying on
the business of a distiller but did not sustain the "very strained infer-
ence" that he had possession and control of the still. The Court reasoned
Even though the presumption disappears, of course a valid inference may remain
in the minds of the jury.
'Montana's position is the result of two statutes. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-5 declares,
"A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by
other evidence, direct or indirect; but unless controverted, the jury are bound to
find according to the presumption." R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-1 provides that:
''Indirect evidence is. of two kinds: (1) Inferences; and, (2) Presumptions." See
Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942).
"State v. Lewis, 67 Mont. 447, 216 Pac. 337, 339 (1923), recognized the power of the
legislature to "prescribe that which shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and shift to the defendant the necessity of satisfactory explanation, in the absence
of express constitutional inhibition." See generally, Brosman, The Statutory Pre-
sumption, 5 TuL. L. REv. 178 (1930); Morgan, Further Observations on Presump-
tions, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1943); Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their Con-
stitutionality and Legal Effect, 10 TEX. L. REv. 34 (1931).
'Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
-330 U.S. 160 (1947).
[Vol. 27,
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that the Internal Revenue Code had focused upon various aspects of the
illicit distilling business and made each of them a separate crime. This
required that "testimony to prove [a] separate offense .... must point
directly to conduct within the narrow margins which the statute alone
defines."'13
Evidently to avoid the result of Bozza, Congress amended the Internal
Revenue Code to include the presumptions stated.14 The Court in both
United States v. Gainey and United States v. Romano, applied the rational
connection test to the amended provisions. The statute under which
Gainey was convicted required proof of the carrying on of the business
of an illegal distillery. The question before the Court, therefore, was
whether there was a rational connection between carrying on the business
and the defendant's presence at the still. The Court concluded there was.
Romano was convicted under the provision requiring proof of the pos-
session, custody and control of an illegal distillery. Here the question was
as to the rational connection between the possession, custody and control
of an illegal distillery and defendant's presence there. Mr. Justice
White, speaking for the majority of the Court, reasoned that presence
at an operating still is sufficient evidence to prove the charge of carry-
ing on because anyone present at the site is quite probably connected with
the illegal business. Presence, however, implies nothing about the de-
fendant's specific function and carries no rational inference that he was
engaged in one of the specialized functions connected with possession.
The United States contended in United States v. Romano that the
effect of the amendments to the Internal Revenue Code was to overrule
Bozza and to broaden the substantive crime of possession to include any
relation to an illegal distillery. The Court, in refusing to accept this view,
said that the amendments did not change the character of the substantive
crime. "Possession, custody or control remain the crime which the Gov-
ernment must prove."'15 Although Congress conceivably has the power
to make presence at an illegal distillery a punishable offense, such con-
duct has no rational connection with possession and is therefore violative
of due process.
Mr. Justice Black dissented in Gainey, finding that Gainey was de-
prived of his constitutional right to trial by jury, of his right to be tried
by a court of law independent of Congressional interference, and of his
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.16 He insisted
that the jury has the constitutional power to determine guilt or innocence
and the exercise of this power cannot be interdicted in whole or in part,
'Id. at 163.
'IS. Rep. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 189 (1958) states that:
These paragraphs are new. Their purpose is to create a rebuttable presumption
of guilt in the case of a person who is found at illicit distilling or rectifying premises,
but who, because of the practical impossibility of proving his actual participation in
the illegal activities except by inference drawn from this presence when the illegal
acts were committed, cannot be convicted under the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Bozza v. United States.
'
5 United States v. Ronano, at 215.
"
5Justice Black would overrule the following excerpt from Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925): "The point that the practical effect of the statute
creating the presumption is to compel the accused person to be a witness against
1966]
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directly or indirectly, by Congress. This position, however, is retrogres-
sive when compared with the tendency of modern decisions and prior
statements of the Supreme Court. 17 For example, in Yee Hem v. United
States the Court said:'8
Every accused person ... enters upon his trial clothed with the pre-
sumption of innocence. But that presumption may be overcome, not
only by direct proof, but, in many cases, when the facts standing
alone are not enough, by the additional weight of a countervailing
legislative presumption. If the effect of the legislative act is to give
to the facts from which the presumption is drawn an artificial value
to some extent, it is no more than happens in respect to a great
variety of presumptions not resting upon statute.
Justice Black himself noted that the courts are less strict about the
"logical strength of presumptive inferences"'19 permitted in civil, as op-
posed to criminal, cases. To apply a presumptive inference in support of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court must and does require a
rational connection of more potency than that required in civil cases.
Further, the majority of the Court in Gainey adopted the view that the
statutory inference "authorizing conviction" was not mandatory, but
permissive. Even if the defendant's presence at the still remained un-
explained, the jury could, nevertheless, acquit him if they found that
the government had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
himself may be put aside with slight discussion. The statute compels nothing. It
does no more than to make possession of the prohibited article prima faecie evidence
of guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not, as lie chooses.''
United States v. Gainey, at 87. The principal grounds on which statutes creating
presumptions have been assailed include: denial of due process of law (Morrison v.
California, supra note 8; Tot v. United States, supra note 11); denial of equal
protection of the laws (Mobile v. Turnipseed, supra note 8; Shea v. North-Butte
Mining Co., 55 Mont. 522, 179 Pac. 499 (1919)) ; encroachment upon the power and
discretion of the judiciary (United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Lewis v.
New York L. Ins. Co., supra note 9); compulsion of the accused to give testimony
against himself (Yee Hem v. United States, supra; State v. Lewis, supra note 10);
and a deprivation of the presumption of innocence (State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15
N.W.2d 554 (1944)).
"TThe Court has repeatedly stated that the legislature may not "declare an individual
guilty" (McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, (1916)) and that a
presumption shall not be conclusive of the rights of the accused. In view of the legis-
lative power over the rules of evidence, where the presumption is based on sound
reasons of probability and policy, and where the defendant has a reasonable oppor-
tunity to interpose his defense, he is not denied due process of law or the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. In Morrison v. California, supra note 8, at 88, Justice
Cardozo noted that,
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof
may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The
limits are in substance these, that the State shall have proved, enough to make it just
for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or
explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.
I'Supra note 16, at 184.
"United States v. Gainey, at 79.
"The trial court in United States v. Gainey, at 70, gave this instruction:
Now this does not mean that the presence of the defendant at the site and place at the
time referred to requires the jury to convict the defendant, if the defendant by the
evidence in the case, facts and circumstances proved, fails to explain his presence to
the satisfaction of the jury. It simply means that a jury may, if it sees fit, convict
upon such evidence, as it shall be deemed in law sufficient to authorize a conviction.
but does not require such a result.
Mr. Justice Black seemed to take the position that the statute was to be read as
5
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The evidentiary effect of the presumption itself will further influ-
ence the court's conclusion as to the rationality of the connection be-
tween the fact proved and the fact presumed. In those courts following
the minority rule that the presumption has the weight of evidence, the
presumption artificially strengthens the prosecution's case. To protect
the rights of the accused, these courts will be more stringent in their re-
quirements of rationality than those which follow the majority.21
Implicit in Justice Black's dissent is the concern that the urge to
simplify the task of the prosecutor by aiding him with presumptions
might some day substitute an inquisitorial procedure for our traditional
accusatory system. The term "accusatory system," however, does not
connote an absolute principle of logic. It must be and is subject to
change to meet the exigencies of the judicial process. In the words of
Professor Wigmore: "There is not the least doubt, on principle, that the
Legislature has entire control over such rules, as it has (when not in-
fringing the Judiciary's prerogative) over all other rules of procedure in
general and Evidence in particular-subject only to the limitations of
the rules of Evidence expressly enshrined in the Constitution. -2 2 The
mere fact that a statute will change the burden of proof in a criminal
case, or will modify the presumption of innocence ought not to condemn
it, if it is both rational and founded upon sound bases of convenience and
fairness.
Mr. Justice Stewart in Gainey noted that "significant weight should
be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experi-
ence and cull conclusions from it." This statement was based on a recog-
nition that from the nature of certain crimes, even in an "atmosphere
pregnant with illegality," the prosecutor is unable to obtain evidence of
complicity. He stated, "Congress was undoubtedly aware that manufac-
turers of illegal liquor are notorious for the deftness with which they
locate arcane spots for plying their trade. Legislative recognition of the
implications of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches-that
strangers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy. ' -2 3
In the areas of narcotics, firearms and alcohol, Congress has consequently
seen fit to aid the prosecutor with a presumption permitting the jury to
providing for a mandatory, rather than permissive presumption. If this were
true, his comments would be more persuasive, but not controlling.
"'This is well illustrated by the antipodal results in Mobile v. Turnipseecd, supra note
8, and Western v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1920). In the first case the Court
found that a statute, providing that proof of injury inflicted by the running of
locomotive or cars was prima facie evidence of negligence, was not violative of due
process nor equal protection of the laws. In the latter case the Court found that a
statute, similarly providing for prima facie negligence upon a showing of injury,
was violative of due process. The Court stated: "The [Turnipseed] statute created
merely a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the introduction of opposing
evidence. That of [Henderson] as construed in this case creates an inference that
is given effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony and is to prevail
unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate." Western v. Henderson,
supra at 643.
2 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 724 (3d ed. 1940).
'United States v. Gainey, at 67.
1966]
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infer the defendant's guilt, leaving him free to offer evidence in rebuttal. 4
It seems, therefore, that the rational connection test, shown to be
flexible in fact, if not in theory, provides a court with an alembic through
which to strain the pertinent considerations of probability, convenience,
fairness to the defendant, and social policy. Remaining cognizant of
legislative control over the rules of evidence, the court is yet given
ample means to protect the constitutional rights of the accused.
HARRY B. ENDSLEY III.
-35 Stat. 614 (1909), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958); 68A Stat. 728 (1954), 26 U.S.C. §
5851 (1958); and statutes cited supra note 2.
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